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A PERSPECTIVE TO RECONSIDER PARTNERSHIP LAWt
DONALD J. WEIDNER*
The Uniform Partnership Act, unchanged in over seventy years, is
being considered for revision by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As Reporter to the Drafting
Committee, Professor Weidner recommends that the revision process
begin with a reconsideration of the fundamentals of partnership law.
The drafters of the present act struggled to reconcile the conflicts
between the entity and aggregate theories of partnership, conflicts
which still permeate partnership law. While theoretical consistency
may be desirable, a pragmatic approach to revision requires a
structuring of partnership law that will serve the needs of both large
and small partnerships. Major factors that must be considered
during revision include the current business and investment uses of
partnerships, changes in the laws that govern other forms of business
organizations, and federal income tax treatment. Several specific
provisions of the present Act that require close scrutiny include those
relating to the duties of care and loyalty, dissolution, and other
remedies available to dissatisfied partners. Professor Weidner
concludes that the revision process can move the law of general
partnership more toward an entity model without adverse tax
consequences.
t © 1988 by Donald J. Weidner.
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; B.S., 1966, Fordham Uni-
versity; J.D., 1969, University of Texas at Austin. Professor Weidner is the Reporter for the
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The author wishes to express his appreciation to his colleague, Professor John W. Larson, and
to Bruce T. Fraser, a second-year law student whose efforts and enthusiasm have made this
project a pleasure.
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE UNIFORM Partnership Act has not been revised in over sev-
enty years. This product of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has enjoyed widespread adoption and
been the object of relatively few state variations. Nevertheless, in
1984, the State of Georgia enacted massive revisions to its partnership
statute.' In January of 1986, an American Bar Association Committee
issued a thoughtful report that recommended an extensive series of
revisions to the Uniform Partnership Act, many of them along the
lines of the recent Georgia changes. 2 In the fall of 1986, Congress en-
acted the Tax Reform Act of 1986.1 The 1986 Act changed the com-
parative tax advantages of partnerships and corporations by setting
corporate income tax rates higher than individual income tax rates
while tightening up on the corporate income tax. Because partnerships
are conduits for federal income tax purposes such that partnership in-
come is taxed not at the entity level but only at the level of the individ-
ual partners, "disincorporation" or "unincorporation" has become a
topic of much discussion. 4 Spurred in part by these developments, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
formally undertaken a project to consider a revision of the Uniform
Partnership Act.
There are two basic ways the Conference of Commissioners might
proceed. First, the Commissioners could proceed directly to the Uni-
form Partnership Act, compare it with the new Georgia statute and
the American Bar Association Report, and quickly edit it to incorpo-
rate the most obviously appealing features of these recent and credible
efforts. Second, the Commissioners could begin their consideration,
not with the details of the latest statute and the recently proposed
1. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-8-1 to -43 (Supp. 1987). See Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's
New Partnership Law, 36 MERCER L. REV. 443 (1985).
2. UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated
Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121
(1987) [hereinafter ABA Report 1. Professor Harry J. Haynsworth, of the University of South
Carolina School of Law, was the Chairman of the ABA Subcommittee.
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. One author summarizes the limited utility of the C corporation as follows:
In particular, the repeal of the so-called General Utilities doctrine, when combined
with the revised corporate alternative minimum tax increases, seems to ... put some
real teeth into . . . the corporate income tax. What this means is that one form of
conducting a business-the traditional C corporation-will be a taxpaying entity, but
the other three traditional forms-S corporations, partnerships, and proprietorships-
will not be. From this simple observation, it is obvious I think, that C corporations
are an endangered species.
Friedrich, The Unincorporation of America?, 14 J. CoRP. TAX'N 3, 4 (1987).
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amendments, but with a broad review of the purposes of partnership
law and the conceptual and practical tensions that cause a reconsider-
ation in the first place. The purpose of this article is to explore the
latter approach. It asks the basic question: What is the continuing
need, if any, for a separate form of business organization called a
partnership? In particular, given developments in the law of corpora-
tions and limited partnerships, what role remains for a partnership
statute?
II. THE ORIGINAL UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
A. Basic Conceptions of the Original Drafters
The original Uniform Partnership Act (Uniform Act) went through
eight tentative drafts over a span of twelve years before approval by
the Conference of Commissioners at their 1914 meeting.' The first two
drafts were submitted to the Committee by Dean James Barr Ames of
the Harvard Law School. On the death of Dean Ames, William
Draper Lewis, of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, took up
the work. Discussing the purposes of the final product, Professor
Lewis stated that the merit of the Uniform Act would depend on
whether it stated the law in simple, clear language, whether it resolved
existing uncertainties, and whether the substantive changes it intro-
duced were beneficial. 6
In discussing the extent to which the Uniform Act eliminated uncer-
tainties, Professor Lewis emphasized that, "there is one matter con-
nected with partnership which legislation cannot make certain. By no
human ingenuity would a Partnership Act which does not abolish
common law partnerships enable the person who reads it to tell in
every supposable case whether there is or is not a partnership." 7 This
statement reflects far nore than a recognition that codification will
never eliminate all uncertainty. It reflects his focus on inadvertent and
other small partnerships and his basic assumption that partnership is a
residual category.
To Lewis, the "fundamental characteristic" of partnership law was
that it is a residual body of law that governs all relationships that are
not "statutory in origin." 8 Unfolding the Uniform Act for public
view, he stated that the uncertainty about whether given arrangements
will constitute partnerships:
5. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 620 (1915).
6. Id. at 621.
7. Id. at 622.
8. Id.
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lies in the fundamental characteristic which distinguishes
partnerships from every other business association. All other
business associations are statutory in origin. They are formed by the
happening of an event designated in a statute as necessary to their
formation. . . . Partnership is the residuum, including all forms of
co-ownership, of a business except those business associations
organized under a specific statute. 9
A statute providing that a partnership is not formed until compliance
with its formalities occurs, continued Lewis, "would not be a statute
regulating common law partnerships, but one abolishing common law
partnership and establishing a new form of statutory association."10 If
no formal act is necessary to establish a partnership, it will not always
be "easy to determine whether the acts proved indicate co-ownership
of a business. Ownership . . . involves the idea of control; but the
degree of control necessary is incapable of exact definition.""
Uncertainty in the law of partnerships was seen as primarily due to
conflicts among the decisions of different states, the absence of legal
authority, even on important issues, and confusion on the legal theory
of partnerships. Lewis thought that the greatest source of uncertainty
was confusion over the basic theory of partnerships, that is, whether
the partnership was to be viewed as an entity or an aggregate.
B. The Entity Versus the Aggregate Approach
The law of partnerships has long been characterized by efforts to
identify those issues to be resolved in accord with the entity theory of
partnerships and those to be resolved in accord with the aggregate the-
ory of partnerships. This dichotomy has long existed under state law,
and has more recently come to exist for federal income tax purposes.
Traditionally, the common law aggregate approach declined to recog-
nize the partnership as an organization with a separate legal personal-
ity. The aggregate approach viewed the partnership as nothing more
than a conduit for the collection of individuals it embraced. Each
partner was seen as owning a direct stake in the partnership assets and
as conducting his pro-rata share of partnership business. The entity
theory, on the other hand, treated the partnership as a distinct, almost
tangible, entity interposed between partners and partnership assets.
The partner's interest was viewed as a separate bundle of rights and
liabilities associated with his participation in the organization, analo-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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gous to the interest of a corporate stockholder in his shares of stock.
As the state law of partnership developed, the adoption of the en-
tity approach was urged on the ground that it was a feature of the law
merchant that reflected business reality more accurately than the ag-
gregate or conduit theory. Ready acceptance of the entity theory was
probably impeded by two nineteenth-century common law preconcep-
tions. The first was the notion that the separate legal personality of a
business organization was associated with relieving its owners from
personal liability. The second was the related notion that organiza-
tional personality was a special privilege to be dispensed only by the
legislature. Neither of these notions transferred readily to the relations
of partners, who were unlimitedly liable and whose relation as part-
ners could be judicially established independent of their intent.
Tension between the two theories continues under state law in part
because the Uniform Act is a product of drafters who espoused op-
posing theories. Dean Ames, who prepared the first two drafts, es-
poused the entity theory, whereas Professor Lewis, who took over
after Ames' death and shepherded the project to completion, strongly
supported the aggregate theory. According to Lewis, "[t]he chief
source of uncertainty [in the common law] . . . as well as the source
of several distinctly inequitable rules of our existing law of partner-
ship is the confusion in regard to the nature of a partnership and the
legal incidents attached to the partner's right in partnership prop-
erty." 1 2 Under his stewardship, the project declared its intent to turn
away from the entity theory and emphasize the common law aggregate
approach."
Although Lewis denounced the entity theory quite roundly, he did
not argue that it had no value. He admitted, for example, that the
entity theory ended some of the confusion in the law concerning the
rights of a partner's separate creditors:
If the partnership is a legal entity against which the partners have
claims for their shares in the profits and in the surplus, after the
payments of debts to third persons, then the separate creditor of a
partner may garnishee the fictitious legal person or bring a bill in
equity against it for the purpose of ascertaining the claims of his
debtor, and having these claims paid over to him, in the satisfaction
of his judgment. ,4
12. Id. at 623.
13. See id. at 640 (discussion of the pivotal meeting resolving to shift from the entity to the
aggregate approach).
14. Id.
19881
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More fundamentally, Lewis rejected the notion that the entity theory
was an accurate reflection of a business practice that treated partner-
ships as entities. 5 He believed that those who advocated the entity or
"mercantile theory" did so because they assumed as an empirical mat-
ter "that business men in partnership transactions, whether inter se or
with third persons, proceed on the fundamental premise on which the
theory is based.' ' 6 He perceived business reality differently:
When a business man deals with persons carrying on business in
partnership, the character of the partners and their total wealth,
individual and collective, is all that is important to him. The rule that
partners are unlimitedly liable for partnership debts is the only thing
approaching a legal theory which he need carry in his mind.' 7
Lewis also claimed that the entity theory made "it impossible to work
out in a satisfactory way the rights of a firm creditor against the sepa-
rate property of a partner."' 8 If the partnership is a "separate legal
personality,"'' 9 he questioned, what is the relationship of the partners
to those who do business with the partnership? Should the partners be
regarded as "co-principals," and the partnership contract be treated
as a joint contract between partners and their partnership entity?20 Or
should the partners be seen as having no legal relationship with part-
nership creditors, 2' having "merely contract[ed] with the legal entity
to pay partnership debts, if the property of the entity is not sufficient
to pay them? '22
Lewis would not accept the second solution, which had been fa-
vored by Ames. He felt it was "cumbersome" to take a position that
"denies all contractual relations between the partners and the person
dealing with the partnership .. "23 He argued that theoretical consis-
tency would require a creditor who obtains a judgment against the
partnership to "bring a new proceeding against the partner whose sep-
arate property he desires to subject to the payment of his debt." ' 24
Lewis said that such an approach would violate the understanding "of
every business man who deals with a partnership, that he is dealing
15. Id. at 639.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 640-41.
18. Id. at 640.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 640-41.
21. Id. at 641.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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with a group of persons who are directly and unlimitedly liable for
partnership obligations. ' 25 Given that you are required to join the
partners as co-principals, said Lewis, why add the "fictitious legal
person? "26
Finally, Professor Lewis said that the "most serious practical diffi-
culty" with the entity theory was that it entails a partnership registra-
tion system and a provision that a partnership cannot exist until it is
registered:
Any system which prevents a partnership from being in existence
until it is registered, and which thus introduces into the law of
partnerships the difficulties which surround de facto corporations,
should not be tolerated for a moment unless the necessity for the
adoption of the theory is imperative. No such necessity exists. 27
The extent to which the final product incorporates the entity as op-
posed to the aggregate theory is very much in the eye of the beholder.
The Uniform Act was greeted by the suggestion that it embodied the
entity theory much more than its drafters cared to admit. 28 Many still
believe that entity notions permeate the Uniform Act, 29 although there
is also respected authority that the aggregate theory predominates.
Learned Hand, for example, thought it would be a "palpable perver-
sion" to derive an entity approach from the Uniform Act:
The Uniform Patnership Act . . . did not . . . make the firm an
independent juristic entity. . . . [Tihe essentials of the old model
were preserved. Indeed, many of the supposed innovations were not
such; for example, the limitation upon a partner's power to assign
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The term "partnership property" is used in § 8 and throughout the Uniform Act. Sec-
tion 8(3) permits the partnership to take and convey title in the partnership name. Section 9(1)
makes every partner an agent of the partnership. Section 12 discusses a fraud by the partner on
the partnership. Section 18(a) imposes on a partner the duty to contribute to the losses of the
partnership. Section 40(a)(2) provides that the right to contributions is a partnership asset. Sec-
tion 18(b) requires the partnership to indemnify the partner in certain cases. Section 21 makes a
partner accountable to the partnership, and § 35 discusses the partner's power to bind the part-
nership after dissolution. One writer comments, "These extracts seem more consistent with the
entity than with the aggregate view of the nature of the partnership and illustrate the difficulty,
if not impossibility, not only of writing and talking about the partnership, but of formulating its
rights and obligations without treating it as a legal person." Crane, The Uniform Partnership
Act: A Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REV. 762, 771 (1915). See also Crane, The Uniform Partnership
Act and Legal Persons, 29 HAxv. L. REV. 838, 843 (1916).
29. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 16-29 (1968) [hereinafter CRANE &
BROMBERG].
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firm property, the declaration that his interest in it "is his share of
the profit and surplus" and the extent of an assignee's interest
acquired by the assignment, had all been law before, at least in some
jurisdiction.... With this history before us, it would be a palpable
perversion to understand the act as creating a new juristic person,
which owned the firm property and was obligor of the firm debts,
against which the partners had only a chose in action, and to which
they were liable as guarantors. 0
Most cases can, of course, be decided without resort to the general
theory of the partnership as an entity versus an aggregate. On the
other hand, it seems clear that the general theory of the organization
will be influential in certain cases. Fairway Development Co. v. Title
Insurance Co.3" is a recent example of a case that appears to have been
decided by resorting to the general notion that a partnership is an ag-
gregate rather than an entity. A real estate development partnership
consisting of three individuals took out a title insurance policy with
the defendant. Subsequently, two of the partners "transferred not just
their interest in the partnership, i.e., their respective shares of profits
and surplus, but their entire respective bundles of partnership rights"
to the remaining partner and a third person.3 2 When an undisclosed
pipeline easement was discovered and the surviving partnership sued
for breach of the title insurance contract, the court held that a new
partnership had been formed and that the new partnership had no
"standing" to bring the action.33 The court was not impressed with
the argument that all members of both the old and the new partner-
ships intended the new partnership to continue with all the assets and
business of the old partnership. The court held that the insurance con-
tract was with the first partnership, which had dissolved.3 4 Hence, the
court held, the title insurance company "is not in privity with the
plaintiff as the named party guaranteed." 35 To emphasize, the court
explained its decision solely as a consequence of the theory that a par-
ticular aggregation of individuals had dissolved, and without any dis-
cussion of the intent or legitimate expectations of the parties,
windfalls, or wipeouts.16
30. Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 591-92 (2d Cir. 1937) (citations omitted).
31. 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
32. Id. at 124.
33. Id. at 125.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 121.
36. In addition to basic partnership provisions based on the Uniform Act, the Ohio statutes
also contain a special supplement on fraud in partnership affairs and the use of fictitious names
in partnerships. Partnerships transacting business in Ohio under names that are fictitious or do
[Vol. 16:1
1988] PAR TNER SHIP PERSPECTIVE
In short, the Uniform Act was still warm from the oven when the
debate started over whether it reflected an aggregate or an entity the-
ory. On the one hand, provisions such as the one that states that "the
partnership is liable" for wrongful acts of partners3 7 clearly reflect an
entity approach. On the other hand, the Uniform Act scrapped the
initial definition of a partnership as "a legal person" formed by the
association of two or more individuals." In the middle, many of its
provisions can be rationalized in terms of either theory. The subse-
quent experience with the federal income tax law of partnerships sug-
gests that it is not necessary to exalt one theory at the cost of the
complete suppression of the other. Each approach has its place, de-
pending on the policies dominant in a particular situation-for exam-
ple, simplicity versus precision. It nevertheless might be helpful to
state the residual theory that will be applied, or tend to be applied, if
other analysis fails. Given that the entity theory seems to inhere in the
Uniform Act more than its final authors cared to admit, given that the
entity theory seems to cut in favor of rather than against simplicity,
and given that partnerships of significant size and complexity have be-
come common, 9 including partnerships with corporations and limited
not reveal the names of all the partners must record a certificate stating the name and residence
of each partner. Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 1777.02 (Anderson 1985). The court in Fairway Devel-
opment found significance in the requirement that a new certificate be filed whenever there is a
change in membership in a registered partnership. 621 F. Supp. at 123. See Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1777.03 (Anderson 1985). Incorrectly assuming that the special supplementary provisions
are part of the Uniform Act, the court found in them further support for the aggregate theory:
[W]here members of a general partnership change, the partnership must file a new
certificate of partnership, unlike a limited partnership, which simply may amend its
certificate of partnership. The fact that the Uniform Partnership Law makes this dis-
tinction supports a finding that the authors of the Uniform Partnership Act recog-
nized that a change of the members of a general partnership in fact changes the
original partnership and creates a new partnership requiring a new certificate, as op-
posed to an amendment to the original certificate.
Fairway Development, 621 F. Supp. at 123.
37. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13, 6 U.L.A. 163 (1914). See also provisions cited supra note
28.
38. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARv. L.
REv. 158, 165 (1915).
39. The accounting partnership in Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987), had
3,570 personnel, 502 of whom were partners, in 80 offices. The court stated:
For many purposes evolving law now classifies partnerships as separate entities rather
than an aggregate of partners; thus partners can be classed as employees of the part-
nership entity. Furthermore, ownership in very large partnerships is de minimus on an
individual basis (Wheeler as one of 500, for instance). Finally, big partnerships are
like corporations: "Wall Street law firms and stock brokerage firms provide signifi-
gant examples. These are often large, impersonal, highly structured enterprises of es-
sentially perpetual duration."
Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 268 (quoting Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1974)) (footnote
omitted).
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partnerships as partners, there is widespread opinion that a revised
Uniform Act should more directly adopt an entity modelA0 The ABA
Report recommends that the entity theory "be incorporated into any
revision of the UPA whenever possible and that the 'aggregate theory'
should be retained only where it appears to be essential, e.g., because
of tax considerations." ' 4' Whether and how to directly embrace an en-
tity model will be a central philosophical question for the Commis-
sioners .42
III. CONTINUITY, DISSOLUTION AND THE DISSATISFIED PARTNER
A. The Tenancy in Partnership
The basic provision for the stability of the partnership form is the
tenancy in partnership. 43 The Uniform Act provides that partnership
property is held by the partners in a special form of coownership des-
ignated tenancy in partnership. 4 As the incidents of the tenancy in
partnership are unfolded, it becomes clear that the partnership is
40. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 36 (1987):
On the whole ... the use of an aggregate theory in the U.'P.A. was unfortunate. Gen-
erally speaking, the entity theory of a partnership is much more functional than the
aggregate theory. In those cases where the U.P.A. does not treat the partnership as if
it were an entity, the result tends to be bad, and in need of correction. In those cases
where the U.P.A. does treat the partnership as if it were an entity, the result is good,
but the statutory approach is often made needlessly complex by the mechanics of rec-
onciling the entity result with the aggregate theory.
41. ABA Report, supra note 2, at 124.
42. The Uniform Partnership Act Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partner-
ships and Unincorporated Business Organizations recommends the following:
(i) Increased emphasis on the entity theory. This is reflected in a number of sections.
The two most significant are the proposed revisions to section 25 limiting a partner's
rights in specific partnership property to the right to use such property in the conduct
of the partnership business and a new short form partnership filing requirement simi-
lar to that required for limited partnerships under the 1985 RULPA amendments....
A third important recommendation is specific authorization for a partnership agree-
ment to contain a provision that prevents a technical dissolution if the remaining part-
ners agree to buy out the interest of a withdrawing partner. A fourth related change is
a recommendation for a new section that will specifically authorize a partnership to
sue and be sued in its own name. It is also recommended that language be included
which makes it clear that a partner who steals money from a partnership can be guilty
of embezzlement, fraud, and related crimes. Finally, the recommendation that a credi-
tor with a judgment against the partnership must exhaust his collection remedies
against the partnership before seeking to enforce the judgment against the individual
assets of the partners also reflects the increased emphasis on the entity theory.
ABA Report, supra note 2, at 124-25.
43. Many in the legal profession seem unaware of the tenancy in partnership or its signifi-
cance. At the extreme, see R. CUNNINGHAM, w. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, LAW OF PROPERTY
196 (1984) ("The tenancy in partnership-a modified form of tenancy in common-has now
been eliminated in all states by the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act.").
44. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 25(1), 6 U.L.A. 326 (1914).
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treated as an independent, almost tangible entity, that stands firmly
between its assets and the partners. The partner has no right to pos-
sess partnership property for nonpartnership purposes. 45 She does
have an equal right with other partners to possess partnership prop-
erty for partnership purposes, but this right "is not assignable except
in connection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in the
same property." 46 Similarly, "[a] partner's right in specific partner-
ship property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a
claim against the partnership."
47
In a very real sense, the effect of the tenancy in.partnership is to cut
off the individual partner from partnership assets. Indeed, the Uni-
form Act provides that the interest of the partner is not in the under-
lying partnership assets, but in the partnership entity: "A partner's
interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and
the same is personal property.' '48 Just as the property interest of
shareholders is viewed as being in their shares, which are their con-
tracts of residual ownership, a partnership interest is seen as a sepa-
rate asset and one that is classified as personal property.4 9
The drafters of the Uniform Act had several important objectives to
be served by the definition of the tenancy in partnership. The first was
the general goal of simplification, which also is frequently the goal
when an entity model is adopted for federal income tax purposes. 0
The second was to incorporate selected features of the law of joint
tenancy into the-law of partnership. For example, when a joint tenant
dies, the surviving joint tenants succeed to the interest of the deceased
tenant in whatever property was held in the joint tenancy." The draft-
45. Id. § 25(2)(a).
46. Id. § 25(2)(b).
47. Id. § 25(2)(c).
48. Id. § 26 at 349.
49. Similarly, for federal income tax purposes, a partner's interest in the partnership is
generally treated as a separate capital asset. I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
50. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 707(a), (c) (1982 & West Supp. 1988).
51. To summarize joint tenancy:
A second form of concurrent ownership, an ancient part of common-law jurispru-
dence known as "joint tenancy," is rooted in the concept that the cotenants comprise,
for at least one purpose, not a number of individuals, each owning an undivided inter-
est, but a corporate unity-a singular legal entity which owns the property. The conse-
quence of this is that joint tenancy involves what is termed "right of survivorship."
This signifies that upon the death of one joint tenant no interest can be transferred
from him to any other person by testate or intestate succession. The surviving joint
tenants (if two or more survive) continue to comprise the unity or entity which owns
the property, and eventually the one who lives longest comprises the unit alone and is
therefore sole owner. [Tihe concept is that upon the death of a joint tenant he simply
ceases to be part of the owning entity-i.e., no interest is "transferred" from him to
anyone ....
J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 338 (5th ed. 1984).
19881
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ers of the Uniform Act felt that "[t]he incident of survivorship fits in
with the necessities of partnership. On the death of a partner, the
other partners and not the executors of the deceased partner should
have a right to wind up partnership affairs. 52 The third goal was to
lay the foundation for a simplified procedure in those cases in which
the separate creditor of one partner wished to secure satisfaction out
of his debtor's interest in the partnership. The basic policy judgment
was that particular pieces of partnership property, and potentially, the
very business of the partnership, should not be jeopardized by every
claim of separate creditors. Thus, the Uniform Act was drafted so
that no partner has any interest in specific partnership assets for her
own personal purposes; she has nothing to convey voluntarily, nor
can her personal creditors force such a conveyance. Rather, her inter-
est in the partnership is her share of the profits and surplus, and it is
against this interest that her separate creditors may seek a charging
order. 3
There seems to be a consensus that the tenancy in partnership
reaches the basic right result but does so awkwardly. The statute be-
gins with a broad declaration that the partners are coowners of part-
nership property. Following that statement, however, is a series of
specific provisions that strip the partners of the usual incidents of
ownership. As one commentator has put it, "under the U.P.A. indi-
vidual partners own the partnership property in theory, but all the
incidents of ownership are vested in the partnership." 5 4 The tenancy in
partnership is perhaps the most telling example of the statute's adop-
tion of an entity solution with a concurrent insistence that it be stated
in aggregate terms. The Commissioners should consider whether the
Uniform Act would be clarified and simplified by a direct statement
that the partnership, like a corporation, owns its assets, and that indi-
vidual partners have no more claim to those assets than do sharehold-
ers to corporate assets.
B. Dissolution and Delectus Personae
Several important questions remain after the initial decision to give
the partnership first claim to the assets of the business. When may the
assets be pulled from the partnership? When does the partnership re-
52. UNrF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 25 comment, 6 U.L.A. 327 (1914).
53. Id. § 28 at 358. "The practical effect of these interpolations into the common law was
to impound firm assets and deprive the individual partners of any control over them except in so
far as they were dealing with them on behalf of the firm as a unit." Commissioner v. Lehman,
165 F.2d 383, 385 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 819 (1948).
54. M. EISENBERG, supra note 40, at 64. Accord CRANE & BROMEERG, supra note 29, at 230.
[Vol. 16:1
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lationship end, voluntarily or not? When the relationship does end,
what are the consequences? When may a partner end his continuing
exposure to personal liability for the actions and deficiencies of his
fellow partners? More narrowly, when may the dissatisfied holder of a
partnership interest insist on being cashed out? May the dissatisfied
partner demand that the partnership assets be liquidated, the partner-
ship liabilities satisfied and the surplus distributed? Or, may the satis-
fied partners continue the business if they buy out the interest of the
dissatisfied partner for its fair value? Or, may they consider the dis-
satisfied partner's investment as locked in for as long as he promised
or for some other period? Two concepts basic to a discussion of these
questions are delectus personae and dissolution.
The term delectus personae, meaning choice of the person, has long
been used to refer to the rule that each of the parties involved must
intend to enter into a partnership relationship. This notion is embod-
ied in the Uniform Act's rule that one cannot "become a member of a
partnership without the consent of all the partners."55
Delectus personae operates mainly to keep out of an existing
partnership someone who receives an interest in the firm by
assignment or inheritance. However, the necessary consent of the
other persons may be given or waived by conduct. Or they may give
it in advance by their agreement, say by providing for freely
transferable interests. Or they may delegate to some of their number
(say a managing partner) the authority to consent for all.5 6
Given the personal liability of partners for each other's conduct, it
makes sense that new partners cannot be "forced" on the member-
ship. On the other hand, a partner's interest is assignable even though
an assignee does not become a partner without the consent of the
other partners . 7 The assignment of a partner's interest does not of
itself cause a dissolution of the firm or entitle the assignee to partici-
pate in management, but it does entitle him "to receive in accordance
with his contract the profits to which the assigning partner would oth-
erwise be entitled." 58
Dissolution is probably the most confusing concept and area in all
of partnership law. In this respect, little has changed since the Uni-
form Act was drafted. Lewis felt the confusion of his day came about
because the term dissolution had no agreed-upon meaning in the part-
55. UNIrF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914).
56. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 29, at 44.
57. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. 353 (1914).
58. Id.
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nership context, once stating, "[t]he subject of the dissolution and
winding up of a partnership is involved in considerable confusion
principally because of the various ways in which the word 'dissolu-
tion' is employed." 5 9
Because of the assumption that a lack of uniform terminology was
the problem, the solution adopted in the Uniform Act is to define
more precisely what is meant by dissolution. The Uniform Act's defi-
nition of dissolution has two basic parts: the first states what dissolu-
tion is; the second states what dissolution is not. Dissolution is
defined to be "the change in the relation of the partners caused by
any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distin-
guished from the winding up of the business." 6 On the other hand,
dissolution is distinguished from winding up and termination: "On
dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the
winding up of partnership affairs is completed." 61 The Official Com-
ment explains that "dissolution designates the point in time when the
partners cease to carry on the business together; termination is the
point in time when all the partnership affairs are wound up; winding
up, the process of settling partnership affairs after dissolution. ' 62 The
Uniform Act definition reflects an aggregate conception that a part-
nership consists not of a business that continues despite occasional or
even frequent changes in membership, but of a very specific cast of
characters. The basic conception is that whenever one of the cast of
characters leaves, the partnership dissolves. This aggregate concept of
dissolution, coupled with the notion that no person can be forced to
remain a partner, led to the basic rule that any partner has the power
to dissolve the partnership at any time, even if to do so would violate
the partnership agreement. 63
Dissolution and its consequences remains an extremely troublesome
area despite the new definitions. The ABA Report recommends sixty-
six changes to the dissolution provisions of the Uniform Act. 64 One
59. Lewis, supra note 5, at 626-27.
60. UNTF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 29, 6 U.L.A. 364 (1914).
61. Id. § 30 at 367.
62. Id. § 29 comment at 365.
63. Id. § 31(2) at 376.
64. The summary of those 66 recommendations is as follows:
In addition to specific authorization for a partnership agreement to prevent a technical
dissolution by authorizing a buyout of a withdrawing partner's interest, the most sig-
nificant recommendations are:
(a) delete bankruptcy of a partner as a cause of dissolution or, alternatively, clarify
whether there should be a distinction for dissolution purposes between a liquidation
proceeding and a rehabilitation or reorganization proceeding;
(b) specifically state that the admission of an additional partner (as opposed to the
[Vol. 16:1
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basic problem is that the Uniform Act leaves uncertainty both about
when dissolution takes place and about its consequences. As the lead-
ing text on partnership puts it:
The statute is imprecise, not in the relative meaning of the three
phrases, but in the incomplete coordination between the general
definition of dissolution (in terms of a partner ceasing to be
associated) and the specific causes of dissolution. Thus there are
dissolutions not covered by specific causes and disassociations of
partners which are not dissolutions. Moreover, the defintion [sic]
confuses cause and effect. 65
Retirement is an example of a cause for dissolution that is not specifi-
cally mentioned in the sections listing the causes of dissolution, al-
though it can be inferred as a cause from those that are listed. 66
admission of a replacement partner) does not cause a dissolution;
(c) eliminate losses as an independent ground for court ordered dissolution (A court
would still have discretionary authority to dissolve a partnership on this basis, how-
ever.);
(d) eliminate any right of an assignee of a partner to obtain a court ordered dissolu-
tion;
(e) specifically authorize a court in a dissolution suit to order remedies other than
dissolution (e.g., damages, attorneys' fees, etc.);
(f) authorize the non-withdrawing partners to continue the partnership after dissolu-
tion and, if they agree to do so within ninety days of a partner's withdrawal, limit the
withdrawing partner's rights to receiving the fair value of his capital and his share of
undistributed profits less any provable damages;
(g) specifically authorize a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty by the re-
maining partners against a wrongfully dissolving or expelled partner;
(h) eliminate the mandatory exclusion of goodwill from the value to be paid to a
wrongfully dissolving partner; and
(i) specifically authorize for the liquidating partners to take appropriate action to
preserve the going concern value of the partnership for a reasonable time.
ABA Report, supra note 2, at 125-26.
65. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 29, at 416-17 (footnotes omitted). The authors note
that failure to furnish additional funds is a dissolution not covered by specific causes. In addi-
tion, "Retirement is an obvious cause of dissolution not specified, although it may fall within
one of the specific causes. Admission of a new partner is not specified as a cause although it is
often said to be. The better view is that it is not." Id. at 417 n.3.
66.
§ 31. Causes of Dissolution
Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners,
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the
agreement,
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertak-
ing is specified,
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned their interests or
suffered them to be charged for their separate debts, either before or after the termi-
16 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:1
Death, on the other hand, is a dissociation from the partnership that
may not result in dissolution. 67 Most basically, the causes and effects
of dissolution are confused. 61
The Uniform Act contains several provisions that attempt to define
the consequences of dissolution. Section 33 concerns the effect of dis-
solution on the authority of a partner to act for the partnership. It
establishes the basic proposition that, "[e]xcept so far as may be nec-
essary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete transactions be-
gun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority of any
partner to act for the partnership." 69 The section then acts as a switch-
board to direct the reader to additional rules contained in section 34,
dealing with the rights of partners to contribution from their fellows
after dissolution, 70 and section 35, dealing with the power of a partner
to bind the partnership to third persons after dissolution. 71 Section 36
addresses the effect of dissolution on the existing liability of a partner,
including the general rule that dissolution "does not of itself discharge
the existing liability of any partner.' '72 Section 37 provides the general
rule that the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved have the
nation of any specified term or particular undertaking,
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with
such a power conferred by the agreement between the partners;
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances
do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express
will of any partner at any time;
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the partnership to be
carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership;
(4) By the death of any partner;
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership;
(6) By decree of court under section 32.
UNIF. PARTNERSHP ACT § 31, 6 U.L.A. 376 (1914). Section 32 provides for dissolution by decree
of court, distinguishing between applications for dissolution by a partner and those made by a
purchaser of a partnership interest. Id. § 32, at 394.
67. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 29, at 417 n.4. The authors cite the death of a
partner when the agreement specifies no dissolution, as an example of a disassociation that is not
a dissolution. In some places this result has been reached by case law and in others it is statutory:
Apparently this result is reached in cases of death and all other disassociations by Ark.
Stats. § 65-129 which appends to U.P.A. § 29 "provided that this change in the rela-
tion of the partners shall not effect a dissolution of the partnership in contravention
or violation of the agreement between the partners."
Id.
68. The ABA Report recommends that, rather than being eliminated, the general definition
of dissolution be tied more closely to the specific causes of dissolution. It recommends that § 29
be amended to provide as follows: "Dissolution is caused in accordance with sections 31 and
32." ABA Report, supra note 2, at 161.
69. UNIT. PARTNERSinp ACT § 33, 6 U.L.A. 423 (1914).
70. Id. § 33(l)(b) at 424.
71. Id. § 33(2).
72. Id. § 36(1) at 436.
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right to wind up, 73 and section 38 discusses the rights of partners to
the application of partnership property on dissolution.74 Section 39
concerns the rights of the parties when the partnership is dissolved for
fraud or misrepresentation,7 and section 40 provides the rules for set-
tling the accounts among partners after dissolution. 76 Of all these pro-
visions, the most controversial is section 38, which governs the rights
of a partner to be cashed out on dissolution. The rights of the dissatis-
fied partner under section 38 are significantly different from the rights
of the dissatisfied corporate shareholder.
C. Rights of the Dissatisfied Partner
Section 38 is said to create a distinction between wrongful and non-
wrongful dissolution. The basic rule on non-wrongful dissolution is
contained in section 38(1):
When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of
the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his co-partners
and all persons claiming through them in respect of their interests in
the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership
property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to
pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners. 77
This provision states the consequences of the rule that, when no defi-
nite term or particular undertaking is "specified" in the partnership
agreement, any partner may dissolve at will without violating the
agreement. 7 This right to force a liquidation of all partnership assets
in discharge of all partnership liabilities may be referred to as the
"full liquidation" right.
The Uniform Act sets out a different set of rules in the case of a
wrongful dissolution, and distinguishes the rights of the wrongful dis-
solver from those of the "innocent" partners. Section 38(2) provides
for the rights of the innocent partners as follows:
When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership
agreement the rights of the partners shall be as follows:
73. Id. § 37 at 444.
74. Id. § 38 at 456.
75. Id. § 39 at 467.
76. Id. § 40 at 468.
77. Id. § 38(1) at 456. Section 38(1) also makes specific provision for the bona fide expul-
sion of a partner: "But if dissolution is caused by expulsion of a partner, bona fide under the
partnership agreement and if the expelled partner is discharged from all partnership liabilities,
either by payment or agreement under section 36(2), he shall receive in cash only the net amount
due him from the partnership." Id.
78. Id. § 31(l)(b) at 376.
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(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall
have,
I. All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this section [full
liquidation rights], and
II. The rights, as against each partner who has caused dissolution
wrongfully, to damages for breach of the agreement.
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully,
if they all desire to continue the business in the same name, either by
themselves or jointly with others, may do so, during the agreed term
for the partnership and for that purpose may possess the partnership
property, provided they secure the payment by bond approved by the
court, or pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution
wrongfully, the value of his interest in the partnership at the
dissolution, less any damages recoverable under clause (2a II) of this
section, and in like manner indemnify him against all present or
future partnership liabilities .
79
The corollary rights of a wrongful dissolver are separately stated. 0 If
the "innocent" partners do not continue the business, the wrongful
dissolver has a right to a full liquidation and distribution of his share
of surplus, minus any damages he owes for his breach of the partner-
ship agreement. If the innocent partners do continue the business, the
wrongful dissolver has the right to have the value of his interest, less
damages caused by the dissolution, "ascertained and paid to him in
cash, or the payment secured by bond approved by the court, and to
be released from all existing liabilities of the partnership; but in ascer-
taining the value of the partner's interest the value of the good-will of
the business shall not be considered."
81
Although courts, almost without exception, hold that any partner
has the power to dissolve at any time,82 at least one recent case has
79. Id. § 38(2) at 456.
80. Id. § 38(2)(c).
81. Id. § 38(2)(c)II at 457.
82. Many decisions reached this result even prior to the Uniform Act:
No partnership can efficiently or beneficially carry on its business without the mutual
confidence and cooperation of all the partners. Even when, by the partnership articles,
they have covenanted with each other that the partnership shall continue for a certa.n
period, the partnership may be dissolved at any time, at the will of any partner, so far
as to put an end to the partnership relation and to the authority of each partner to act
for all; but rendering the partner who breaks his covenant liable to an action at law
for damages, as in other cases of breaches of contract.
Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 334-35 (1897) (citations omitted).
[E]ach partner has a power to dissolve the connection at any time, notwithstanding
any convention to the contrary.... [Tihe power results from the nature of the associ-
ation .... [I]t is for the public interest that no partner should be obliged to continue
in such a partnership against his will, inasmuch as the community of goods in such a
[Vol. 16:1
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suggested that certain partnerships may indeed be made indissoluble.
In Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. , s the First Circuit
noted the "wealth of precedent to the effect that a court cannot en-
join the dissolution per se of a partnership." 84 Nevertheless, the court
stated that the cases cited all had a strong personal services flavor,
and refused to assume that personal services were an important ingre-
dient in the case at hand. After noting what it characterized as a
"strong presumption against specific performance of a joint venture
or partnership agreement," 85 the court nevertheless suggested an ex-
ception was appropriate:
Where all parties to the agreement are corporations and there has
been a dissolution per se of the relationship, however, and legal
remedies have explicitly been found inadequate, a court may order
specific performance of the agreement if the relationship is found to
be without a significant personal service component. That is, if the
joint venture or partnership can be maintained as an ongoing, profit-
making concern without obliging any officer or director of the
corporation that per se dissolved the relationship "to continue in
such a partnership against his will," then specific performance may
be ordered, again assuming the inadequacy of a legal remedy. By
"specific performance" in this context we mean that the district
court may order the corporate co-venturers to continue the business
together according to the terms of the joint venture agreement. 6
In light of the long history of the free dissolvability of partnerships,
Infusaid is a striking development that has already excited scholarly
comment suggesting that partners should be permitted to contract
away the power to dissolve.17
case engenders discord and litigation.
3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 56 (0. Holmes, Jr. 12th ed. 1873) (citations
omitted).
83. 739 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 668.
85. Id. at 669.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. One commentator writes:
Because an agreement concerning duration is normally reached as a method of stabi-
lizing a partnership, it should be given just that effect. If permitted to bargain effec-
tively on this issue, partners most concerned with the adverse consequences of an early
dissolution could pay the price for, and enjoy the benefits of, stability. Partnership
law can facilitate this objective by denying a partner the unilateral power to dissolve a
partnership by express will prior to the expiration of the term previously accepted by
that partner. An agreement concerning duration, in short, should effectively deny a
partner the power to unilaterally cause a premature dissolution through an expression
of will. If cause exists, the dissatisfied partner may seek a decree of dissolution.
Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 691, 731 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
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The Commissioners should consider whether the dissolution provi-
sions of the Uniform Act should be changed to give at least some
partnerships greater stability. 8 Consider first the full liquidation right
that exists unless there is an agreement to the contrary. It is an ex-
tremely powerful remedy. Some have suggested that it is too powerful
a remedy and that, to avoid its consequences, courts struggle mightily
to "find" oral or implicit agreements to continue for a definite term
or until the expiration of a particular undertaking. 89 The Commission-
ers should consider whether this remedy ought be continued or how it
should be modified. Consider next the rules that should apply when
there is an agreement to continue for a stated period or the accom-
plishment of a stated purpose-the Infusaid situation. Why should a
dissatisfied partner be entitled to a buyout of his partnership interest
at any time? Is his protection too great when compared with that of-
fered his fellow partners? Should the rights of the dissatisfied partner
vary depending on whether the source of his dissatisfaction is inside
the partnership or from pressures external to the partnership?
If the dissolution power is to be confined, the question becomes
what lesser remedies are available to the dissatisfied participant. Sub-
chapter E of the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to
the Model Business Corporation Act9° is particularly instructive. Sec-
tion 4091 lists situations in which the shareholder of a statutory close
corporation may petition a court for relief. Section 41,92 entitled "Or-
dinary Relief," provides that a court may award any one or more of a
number of types of relief, including the performance or set aside of
any corporate action, the change of corporate articles or bylaws, the
removal or appointment of any director or custodian, an accounting,
and the payment of dividends or damages. If the court finds that the
ordinary relief described in section 41(a) is or would be inadequate or
inappropriate, it may order the corporation dissolved under section
4393 unless the corporation or one or more of its shareholders pur-
chases all the shares of the dissatisfied shareholder for their fair value
and on terms described under section 42(b). 94 Although the merits of
88. See Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 357
(1987), in which the author proposes new dissolution provisions.
89. See Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consider-
ation of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1,
16-26 (1982).
90. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUpp. §§ 40-43 (1983).
91. Id.§40.
92. Id.§ 41.
93. Id. § 43. See id. § 41(a).
94. Id. § 42(b).
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these particular provisions are of course debatable, the Uniform Act
might be substantially improved by similar provisions describing a
range of remedies short of full liquidation or buyout.
IV. DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND CARE
The Uniform Act provides that "[elvery partner must account to
the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits
derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of
the partnership or from any use by him of its property." 95 Although a
basic purpose of this provision was to give excluded partners priority
over the personal creditors of the disloyal partner as to traceable
usurped assets, 96 it is also generally seen as the basic statutory embodi-
ment of the fiduciary role of partners as among themselves. The fidu-
ciary duties begin when the parties first become partners and continue
even after dissolution through the process of winding up. 97
At the heart of the fiduciary duties among partners is each partner's
duty to refrain from appropriating a "partnership opportunity." One
leading text has described partnership opportunity to include "an ac-
tivity necessary or clearly related to the partnership's operations, one
offered to or learned about through the partnership, and one devel-
oped with partnership funds and facilities." 9 The duty to refrain
from diverting a partnership opportunity continues even after the
partnership is dissolved. If it did not, a falling out could be staged to
effect a diversion of a partnership opportunity. 99
Case law indicates that the duty of loyalty is both vague and power-
fully stated. It apparently varies with the circumstances, and is partic-
95. UNIF. PARTNERSIP ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 258 (1914).
96. An explanation of this situation is offered by the Official Comment:
A, B and C are partners; A, as a result of a transaction connected with the conduct of
the partnership, has in his hands, so that it may be traced, a specific sum of money or
other property. A is insolvent. Is the claim of the partnership against A a claim
against him as an ordinary creditor, or is it a claim to the specific property or money
in his hands? The words "and to hold as trustee for the partnership any profits"
indicate clearly that the partnership can claim as their own any property or money that
can be traced.
Id. § 21 comment.
97. See generally CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 29, at 389-97.
98. Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
99. "Fiduciary duties are among the most important aspects of partnership .... Without
the protection of fiduciary duties, each [partner] is at the others' mercy." Id. at 389. "Partners
are not relieved of fiduciary duties by strained relations. . . . If this were true, 'a designing
fiduciary could easily bring about such relations to set the stage for a sharp bargain."' Id. at 394
(footnotes omitted).
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ularly strict in the case of a managing partner. Meinhard v. Salmon 100
is generally considered the classic statement of the fiduciary duties of
a managing partner, even though the case itself is not based on an
explicit finding that a partnership existed. Salmon was a "real estate
operator" who acquired a twenty-year lease of the Hotel Bristol. The
lease required Salmon to spend a large sum on improvements neces-
sary to adapt the structure to use for offices and retail outlets. These
improvements were to be treated as accretions to the land. One month
later, Salmon entered into a written "joint venture" agreement with
Meinhard, a "woolen merchant," which provided that Meinhard was
to pay Salmon half of the monies required "to reconstruct, alter,
manage and operate the property."'' 1 In return, Salmon was to pay
Meinhard forty-percent of the net profits for the first five years and
fifty-percent for the years thereafter. Any losses were to be borne by
them equally. Salmon, however, was to have sole power to manage
and operate the building. Indeed, it appears that the lessor was not
even aware of Meinhard's existence. 0 2 The venture between Salmon
and Meinhard ultimately proved profitable, "with the result that for
each of the investors there came a rich return."103
By the end of the lease, one Elbridge T. Gerry had become the
owner of the reversion and was engaged in the process of site assem-
bly. He owned other property in the neighborhood, including lots ad-
joining the Hotel Bristol. He planned to lease the entire tract for a
long term to someone who would destroy the existing buildings and
construct another in their place. After unsuccessfully seeking financ-
ing from several other sources, Gerry finally approached Salmon. As
a result of the ensuing negotiations, with only four months to run on
the lease of the Hotel Bristol to Salmon, Gerry entered into a new
lease with a corporation owned and controlled by Salmon. This new
lease covered the entire assembled site and required the tenant to con-
struct a three million dollar building. After learning of the new lease,
Meinhard made demand that it be held in trust as an asset of his ven-
ture with Salmon, and Salmon refused. A referee held that Meinhard
did have a right to share in the new lease, and a divided intermediate
court of appeals affirmed.
Chief Judge Cardozo exceeded even his own extraordinary abilities
at phrasemaking in writing the opinion upholding the decision in fa-
vor of Meinhard. He began by stating that Meinhard and Salmon
100. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
101. Id. at 462, 164 N.E. at 546.
102. Id. at 477, 164 N.E. at 552 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 462, 164 N.E. at 546.
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"were coadventurers, subject to fiduciary duties akin to those of part-
ners," but that the "heavier weight of duty" rested on Salmon."°4
"He was a coadventurer with Meinhard, but he was a manager as
well." 05 He continued with language that has become among the most
quoted in partnership law: -
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty .... Only thus has the level
of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowdY°6
Judge Cardozo stated it was inappropriate for Salmon to silently ex-
clude his coadventurer from an opportunity that was an incident of
their enterprise. "No answer is it to say that the chance would have
been of little value even if seasonably offered. Such a calculus of
probabilities is beyond the science of the chancery." 07 He stated that
a constructive trust was to be applied to subordinate "preference of
self" to loyalty to others. Finally, he explained that the decision was
based neither on a finding of bad faith by Salmon nor on a finding of
the ineluctability of Meinhard's claim:
We have no thought to hold that Salmon was guilty of a conscious
purpose to defraud. Very likely he assumed in all good faith that
with the approaching end of the venture he might ignore his
coadventurer and take the extension for himself. He had given to the
enterprise time and labor as well as money. He had made it a
success. Meinhard, who had given money, but neither time nor
labor, had already been richly paid. There might seem to be
something grasping in his insistence upon more. Such recriminations
are not . . . without their force if conduct is to be judged by the
common standards of competitors. That is not to say that they have
pertinency here. Salmon . . . was much more than a coadventurer.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 466-67, 164 N.E. at 547-48.
19881
24 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
He was a managing coadventurer. For him and for those like him the
rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme."10
At one level, it seems hard to argue with the broad proposition that a
managing partner must not take advantage of his superior knowledge
and control to divert a partnership opportunity."°9 At another, the
correctness of the result is less than obvious if a "grasping" inactive
partner has been victorious at the expense of an active partner who
has acquitted himself "in all good faith.""' 0 Judge Andrews, in whose
dissent two other judges joined, felt that Salmon's fiduciary duty
should be confined to opportunities "within the scope" of the original
joint venture. To the three dissenters, that original venture was de-
signed "to exploit a particular lease," and was never intended to be
expanded "into a far greater undertaking lasting for many years."''
The Uniform Act would be improved if it clarified the basic relation-
ship between fiduciary duties and the parties' intent and offered
greater guidance on the rules that apply in duty of loyalty situa-
tions."' 2
A related series of questions concerns the extent to which the fiduci-
ary duties of managing or other partners can be drafted away. If the
basic purpose of the fiduciary duties is to protect the presumed legiti-
mate expectations of the parties, the parties should have great latitude
to define those expectations by agreement. On the other hand, waivers
with respect to specific contemporaneous transactions may present
108. Id. at 467-68, 164 N.E. at 548 (citations omitted).
109. Many cases are equally strict in resolving all doubt against managing partners. For ex-
ample, one court wrote:
[They stand] in a higher fiduciary relationship with the other partners than partners
usually occupy. The burden is upon the managing partner to dispel all doubts con-
cerning his conduct toward the partnership or the other partners, and if he is unable to
carry this burden all doubts will ordinarily be resolved against him.
Conrad v. Judson, 465 S.W.2d 819, 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1041 (1972). See also Slingerland v. Hurley, 388 So. 2d 587, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA) (a
managing partner "cannot take in-house advantage of his co-partners"), appeal dismissed, 394
So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1980).
110. A higher authority may have decided that Meinhard was awarded too much. The new
building was not completed until after the stock market crashed and the depression was under-
way. Meinhard died, and left his heirs a share of losses, not profits:
The old building had been profitable but by the time the new one was ready in 1931
the fall in the value of real estate made its operation impossible except at a loss, and
Salmon and Meinhard were either compelled to pay the deficits, or to suffer the prop-
erty to become unoccupied and perhaps to pass out of their hands. Meinhard had died
and his estate paid to Salmon his part of the deficits ....
Salmon v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 203, 204 (2d Cir. 1942).
111. Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 478, 164 N.E. at 552.
112. See the more specific statements of the duty of loyalty in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 387-394 (1958).
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fewer problems than do waivers of unidentified future transactions." 3
Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 14 citing Meinhard for the
proposition that "a managing or general partner of a limited partner-
ship is bound in a fiduciary relationship with the limited partners,"" 5
suggests that some fiduciary duties can be waived prospectively. Five
out of approximately 350 limited partners were permitted to bring a
derivative suit on behalf of the partnership. Although the defendants
were the four general partners of the limited partnership, they were
sued not in that capacity but in their capacity as parties who had as-
sumed a rental obligation to the partnership. The defendants resisted
the action for rent on the ground that they, in their capacity as general
partners of the plaintiffs' partnership, had released themselves from
the rent liability. The plaintiffs countered that the release was invalid
because it constituted self-dealing in violation of their fiduciary obli-
gations as general partners." 6
It would have been difficult to dispute the fact of self-dealing, given
the general partners "leased the motel to their own thinly capitalized
corporation and then consented" to a series of assignments to other
entities they owned or controlled. The question was whether the self-
dealing was inappropriate under the circumstances. "Ordinarily,"
said the court,
such self-dealing would render the defendants incapable, as general
partners . . . from releasing themselves from liability on the
lease .... However, partners may include in the partnership articles
practically "any agreement they wish" and, if the asserted self-
dealing was actually contemplated and authorized, it would not, ipso
facto, be impermissible and deeemed wrongful . . .. [T]he limited
partners were fully apprised in the prospectus that the defendant
general partners intended to lease the premises to their own [thinly
capitalized] corporation.... This clear statement of purpose has the
effect of "exonerating" the defendants, at least in part, "from
adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn against them"
simply from the fact that they dealt with themselves. 17
The partner's duty of loyalty can be distinguished from his duty of
care."' Although the Uniform Act has a number of provisions that
113. Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974).
114. 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966).
115. Id. at 547, 223 N.E.2d at 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
116. Id. at 548, 223 N.E.2d at 877-78, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
117. Id. at 548, 223 N.E.2d at 880, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 392-93 (citations omitted).
118. See, e.g., Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 928, 524 P.2d 233
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can be seen as embodying a duty of loyalty,11 9 it contains no direct
statement of a duty of care. Although the duty of care is generally
described as one of reasonableness, the concept remains relatively un-
developed. What little case law there is in the partnership context sug-
gests that partners will not be liable for breach of a duty of care unless
they are at least grossly negligent. 20 Although there is much greater
discussion of the duty of care in the corporate area, there is a similar
paucity of cases imposing liability on directors simply for breach of a
duty of care.121 Some of the most recent developments in the corpo-
rate area, however, have generated significant discussion of the appro-
priate statutory treatment of the duty of care. 22
There is a wide range of questions that should be considered in the
revision of the Uniform Act, some of them very fundamental. Should
a new partnership act explicitly define duties of loyalty and care that
will govern the partners in the absence of agreement? Should those
duties be imposed on all partners or only on managing partners? May
the presumptive duties be drafted away or indemnified against? The
(1974):
The duty of loyalty resulting from a partner's fiduciary position is such that the
severity of a partner's breach will not be questioned. The question is only whether
there has been any breach at all.
This is to be distinguished from questions related to the use of business judgment of
a partner in partnership affairs. Here the degree of care required is one of reasonable-
ness, or in some jurisdictions, of good faith.
Id. at 238 (citations omitted).
119. See, e.g., UNIF. PATNEsntp ACT § 19, 6 U.L.A. 254 (1914) (duty to provide access to
partnership books); id. § 20 at 256 (duty to inform); id. § 21 at 258 (partners accountable as
fiduciaries); id. § 22 at 284 (right to an account).
120. One commentator notes:
An examination of the particular facts in a number of these cases reveals . . . that
courts are excusing as "mistakes" what would be regarded as negligent conduct in
other contexts. The amount of negligence which will be excused has not been defi-
nitely determined by the courts, but more recent decisions interpreting the duty of care
indicate a trend toward a gross negligence standard.
Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IowA L. REv. 902, 904 (1963).
121. See Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability. Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the
Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 239, 240 n.3 (1987) (there is a
"paucity of cases in which a director's negligent actions, uncomplicated by any showings of bad
faith or self-dealing, formed the basis of a finding of personal liability").
122. Lee continues:
Recently, a reawakening of the duty of care has broken the relative tranquility of
corporate America. That awakening has brought about what many have called a "cri-
sis," real or imagined. The talk of crisis has been sparked by recent well-publicized
cases finding directors in breach of their duty of care, and by a concurrent violent
swing in the insurance markets making directors' and officers' liability insurance
("D&O insurance") painfully expensive or simply unavailable .... These develop-
ments, in turn, have sent lobbyists scurrying to state legislative bodies seeking statu-
tory remedies for their woes.
Id. at 240-41.
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relation of the duty of care to the duty of loyalty ought be considered
directly in part because there are many situations that can be ap-
proached from either duty. The Revised Model Business Corporation
Act distinguishes the two by providing separate sections on General
Standards for Directors, duty of care, 23 and on Director Conflict of
Interest, duty of loyalty. 24 Similarly, the American Law Institute's
Corporate Governance Project continues the distinction. 2  The ABA
Report recommends that the Uniform Act "be revised to incorporate
the full range of fiduciary duties developed by the cases," and further
recommends that the business judgment rule be expressly applied to
partnerships. 26 A basic question facing the Commissioners is the ex-
tent to which a new partnership statute should directly address these
concepts and developments that have been so controversial in the cor-
porate area.
V. LIMITED LIABILITY
It is today the most ministerial of matters for entrepreneurs to set
up a corporation, thereby avoiding the unlimited personal liability im-
posed on partners. Each state now has a "general incorporation act,"
so called because it is a single statute that makes corporations gener-
ally available to anyone who follows a purely mechanical procedure.
Creating a corporation is similar to what the process for obtaining a
driver's license would be if competency testing were stripped away.
The result of one or two secretarial acts is the creation of what is, in
the eyes of the law, a separate legal person, of potentially infinite life,
that can engage in any lawful business activity. The general incorpora-
tion act provides for the relationships among the shareholders them-
selves, and the fundamental rule that the corporate entity insulates
shareholders from liability to the outside world for claims arising
from corporate business.
123. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
124. Id. § 8.31.
125. The Institute's discussion of the duty of loyalty begins with the following statement of
its relation to the duty of care:
[B]oth analytically and normatively the principle of loyalty precedes that of due care.
Analytically, the principle of loyalty has primacy in that the duty of care entails the
principle of loyalty. As stated in § 4.01(a) of Tentative Draft No. 4, the conduct of an
officer or director conforms to the duty of care when it is "in good faith, in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation .... Normatively,
the principle of loyalty to the corporation specifies the direction in which the efforts
are to be made that are regulated by the due care requirement.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ix (Am. Law Inst.
Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986).
126. ABA Report, supra note 2, at 151.
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General incorporation acts were hotly resisted throughout a large
portion of our nation's history. In the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the idea of the large corporation was viewed as vaguely un-
American. It sounded too much like advocacy for a return to a royal
family, self-perpetuating, aggrandizing and above-the-law, to urge the
creation of legal persons, of potentially infinite life, behind whom the
wealthy classes could hide, to engage in any activity and accumulate
unlimited wealth. Initially, state legislatures refused to create corpora-
tions any faster than one at a time; a special statute was required to
create each corporation. Shareholder freedom from personal liability
was seen as an extraordinary statutory privilege. The personal liability
of partners was considered the norm, and extraordinary justification
had to be shown for deviating from that norm. The extraordinary jus-
tification was often found in the nature of the endeavor. State legisla-
tors were more willing to create corporations to insulate shareholders
from personal liability for projects that were perceived to be particu-
larly beneficial to the common weal, such as the construction of
roads, bridges and barge canals.
Venture capitalists pressed their case for a share in profits without
exposure to unlimited personal liability. In 1822, decades before states
were willing to pass general incorporation acts, New York and Con-
necticut passed this country's first limited partnership statutes. Based
on the French Societe en Commandite, the limited partnership acts
generally authorized the creation of partnerships with two classes of
"partners," general and limited. This basic approach is a distant ante-
cedent to that used today. General partners were what we normally
think of as partners, persons who are unlimitedly personally liable to
the contract and tort creditors of the business. Limited partners, on
the other hand, were passive investors who could lose their protected
status as limited partners if they took part in the control of the busi-
ness. In short, if the limited partners were truly passive investors, and
if they followed a statutorily prescribed procedure for publicly record-
ing their status as passive investors, they would be insulated from per-
sonal liability to the creditors of the partnership.
Limited partnership statutes later spread, and limited partnerships
became quite popular. However, by the late nineteenth century, inter-
est in limited partnerships began to fade as the corporate form became
more freely available. State legislatures had been passing, and then
liberalizing, general incorporation acts. Initially, for example, it was
common for state statutes to limit how long a corporate charter could
last. Like today's so-called "sunset" legislation, corporate charters
were created to expire, for example, after twenty years. Only in time
would perpetual corporations become acceptable. There were also lim-
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its on the amount of capital any particular corporation could have,
because the fear of unlimited accumulations of wealth lingered. Over
time, various restrictions were gradually-then rapidly-liberalized, as
some states actually competed with each other for success in what
came to be perceived as the lucrative business of selling corporate
charters.
With the advent of more permissive state incorporation laws, the
limited partnership entered a period of relative dormancy that would
last until the last half of the twentieth century when, for reasons of
federal income tax law rather than state law, it exploded into popular
usage. It was in this period of relative dormancy that the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA)127 was drafted. The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
ULPA in 1916, just two years after it approved the Uniform Act.
The ULPA replaced the assumptions of the prior law of limited
partnerships with two boldly different ones:
First: No public policy requires a person who contributes to the
capital of a business, acquires an interest in the profits, and some
degree of control over the conduct of the business, to become bound
for the obligations of the business; provided creditors have no reason
to believe at the times their credits were extended that such person
was so bound.
Second: That persons in business should be able, while remaining
themselves liable without limit for the obligations contracted in its
conduct, to associate with themselves others who contribute to the
capital and acquire rights of ownership, provided that such
contributors do not compete with creditors for the assets of the
partnership. 128
The ULPA Official Comment, which is quite brief, does make one
fundamental point repeatedly: henceforth, a limited partner, "though
in accordance with custom called a limited partner, is not in any sense
a partner. He is, however, a member of the association."' 2 9 The basic
pattern of the old laws continued. The limited partner was still re-
quired to indicate her limited status on a recorded certificate of lim-
ited partnership and refrain from taking part in the control of
partnership business.
For decades after the adoption of the ULPA, the limited partner-
ship remained a relatively insignificant form of business association.
127. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 561 (1916) (act superseded in 1976).
128. Id. § 1 comment at 564.
129. Id.
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By the early 1960's, however, it had become clear that limited partner-
ships were being classified as partnerships for federal income tax pur-
poses. Limited partners were thus offered limited liability similar to
that available in the corporate form, minus the corporate income tax,
plus the "pass through" of tax losses available to those who are clas-
sified as partners for federal income tax purposes. Because of this at-
tractive combination of advantages, limited partnerships began to
proliferate, particularly in depreciable real estate and oil and gas. In
1976, the Conference of Commissioners replaced the bare-bones origi-
nal act with a new act (1976 Act). 130 Although the 1976 Act was gener-
ally viewed as an improvement, it was but one step needed to update
the statutory foundation for a form of business organization that had
exploded in currency and come to be used in a wide range of sophisti-
cated transactions involving many investors and large sums of money.
In 1985, the Conference of Commissioners issued the latest version of
the ULPA, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RULPA).' 31
The RULPA is dramatically different from the first limited partner-
ship act approved by the Commissioners. It is true that a limited part-
nership is still formed by filing a certificate of limited partnership. 132
On the other hand, although the name and business address of each
general partner must be shown on the certificate, 3 it is no longer nec-
essary to name the limited partners, much less list their contribu-
tions. 34 Furthermore, whereas under prior law a limited partner could
receive her interest for cash or property but not services, under the
130. REVISED UNIF. LImITED PARTNERSIi, ACT, 6 U.L.A. 205 (1976) (West Supp. 1987)
(amended 1985).
131. REVISED UNU. LIMrTED PARTNERSHIP, ACT, 6 U.L.A. 205 (1985) (West Supp. 1987).
132. Section 201(b) provides:
(b) A limited partnership is formed at the time of the filing of the certificate of
limited partnership in the office of the Secretary of State or at any later time specified
in the certificate of limited partnership if, in either case, there has been substantial
compliance with the requirements of this section.
Id. § 201(b) at 249.
133. Id. § 201(a)(3).
134. The Official Comment to the RULPA explains:
The 1985 Act requires far fewer matters to be set forth in the certificate of limited
partnership than did Section 2 of the 1916 Act and Section 201 of the 1976 Act. This is
in recognition of the fact that the partnership agreement, not the certificate of limited
partnership, has become the authoritative and comprehensive document for most lim-
ited partnerships, and that creditors and potential creditors of the partnership do and
should refer to the partnership agreement and to other information furnished to them
directly by the partnership and by others, not to the certificate of limited partnership,
to obtain facts concerning the capital and finances of the partnership and other mat-
ters of concern.
Id. § 201 comment at 249-50.
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RULPA a limited partner may receive her interest for services or for
the mere promise to render services in the future.131 In addition, the
RULPA anticipates that limited partners may be given voting rights
on a wide range of matters, 3 6 and strengthens the provisions that pro-
tect their limited liability.
There are three basic ways the RULPA enhances the protection of
the limited liability of limited partners. First, it expressly imposes a
reliance requirement on plaintiffs who pursue the personal liability of
limited partners on the ground that they have taken part in the "con-
trol" of the partnership business.17 "[I]f the limited partner partici-
pates in the control of the business, he . . . is liable only to persons
who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believ-
ing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner
is a general partner."' 38 Second, the RULPA provides that a limited
partner does not participate in control by proposing, approving, or
disapproving, by voting or otherwise, one or more of a wide range of
matters. 39 Third, the RULPA provides that a wide range of active
participations in partnership affairs will not be deemed, singly or in
combination, to constitute participation in control. 4° The RULPA
abandoned the concept that a limited partner's participation in con-
trol is excessive if it is "substantially the same as the exercise of the
powers of a general partner.' 14' In short, under the new safe harbor
provisions, a limited partner can be much more active both in funda-
mental business decisions and in day-to-day operations than many
general partners and still not run afoul of the control limitation. 42
135. Id. § 101(2) at 230.
136. "Subject to Section 303, the partnership agreement may grant to all or a specified
group of the limited partners the right to vote (on a per capita or other basis) upon any matter."
Id. § 302 at 281.
137. Id. § 303(a) at 282.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 303(b)(6).
140. Id. § 303(b).
141. REVISED UNIF. Lnr'nED PARTNERSHip ACT, 6 U.L.A. 205, 282 (1976) (West Supp. 1987)
(amended 1985). Section 303(a) of the 1976 Act provided, in part: "[I]f the limited partner's
participation in the control of the business is not substantially the same as the exercise of the
powers of a general partner, he . . . is liable only to persons who transact business . . . with
actual knowledge of his participation in control." Id. § 303(a). The Official Comment explained:
[Blecause of the difficulty of determining when the "control" line has been over-
stepped, it was thought it unfair to impose general partner's liability on a limited part-
ner except to the extent that a third party had knowledge of his participation in the
control of the business. On the other hand, in order to avoid permitting a limited
partner to exercise all of the powers of a general partner while avoiding any direct
dealings with third parties, the "is not substantially the same as" test was introduced.
Id. § 303 comment at 283.
142. Certain states have enacted provisions even more protective of the right of limited part-
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It is unclear how, if at all, the developments in the law of limited
partnerships should inform the general partnership statute. For one
thing, it seems that the state policy in favor of imposing personal lia-
bility on a profit sharer who takes part in the control of an unincor-
porated business has all but vanished. Why should there continue to
be personal liability in the case of general partnerships? What if a sys-
tem of registration is adopted for general partnerships? Should mem-
bers of registered partnerships be free from personal liability? Should
the law of the "silent partner" be reconsidered? Why impose unlim-
ited personal liability on a silent inadvertent partner if a silent limited
partner, indeed, an active limited partner, has no liability? More gen-
erally, why should a creditor who has not relied on the personal liabil-
ity of another ever be able to establish it? Further, and not unrelated,
how far have we deviated from the notion that partnerships are infor-
mal, personal relationships with each partner participating directly in
management? Should the partnership law assume such intimacy and
agency authority unless it is drafted away? If voting rights are author-
ized by statute in the case of a limited partnership, should they also be
addressed in the general partnership statute? And, if there are voting
rights, haven't we come almost all the way to recognizing that a part-
nership is an entity with centralized management very much like that
in a corporation? Why not, then, consider a range of specific statu-
tory provisions that honestly and directly embrace the entity model?
Specific provisions could aim at narrow problem areas facing all part-
nerships, such as preventing future decisions like Fairway Develop-
ment. 143 More broadly, a wide range of other provisions could
accommodate the world of the large partnership and make analogies
between partnership and corporate law more accessible.
VI. LESSONS OF PARTNERSHIP TAX LAW
The federal income tax law governing the taxation of partners and
partnerships should be considered for two basic reasons. First, the tax
law suggests that pragmatism rather than partisanship be brought to
the entity/aggregate controversy. Just as there are separate statutes
under state law governing corporations and partnerships, there are
separate subchapters of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) govern-
ing corporations and partnerships. The tax law of Subchapter K, gov-
erning partners and partnerships, is helpful because it indicates a
ners to take an active part in the business. See Weidner, New Limited Liability for Florida Lim-
ited Partners, 16 STETSON L. REv. 113 (1986), for a discussion of the provisions in Delaware and
Florida.
143. Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
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pragmatic approach to the entity/aggregate dichotomy. It suggests
that there is no need to adopt one theory as the exclusive theory. It
suggests, instead, that some questions are best handled with an entity
approach whereas others are best, or at least satisfactorily, handled
through an aggregate approach. It also suggests that in other cases,
the partners themselves may elect either an entity or an aggregate ap-
proach. Second, tax law may be the ultimate constraint on the part-
nership project.
Tension between the entity and aggregate approaches exists in fed-
eral income tax law even though none of our general revenue codes
has ever taxed partnerships as entities.'" A certain amount of schizo-
phrenia is unavoidable because of the basic structure of the tax law.
Although the partnership is not a separate tax-paying entity, it is a
separate entity for the purposes of computing, reporting, and allocat-
ing the economic and tax consequences of partnership activities. The
partnership has its own taxable year 45 and it, rather than the individ-
ual partners, makes the basic decisions with respect to the computa-
tion of partnership income.146 The partnership determines, for
example, the method of computing depreciation of partnership prop-
erty, 47 whether to use a cash or accrual method of accounting, 4 and
whether to elect to report income under the installment method.149
It is clear that in many cases the entity approach is preferred not so
much because it reaches the "right result" but because of its simplic-
ity. At the extreme, the partnership-level audit provisions were the
only way the Internal Revenue Service could begin to deal with tax
shelter syndications. 50 In other situations, the entity approach is used
in a more narrow way to prevent the partners from entering arrange-
144. The War Revenue Act of 1917 is a notable supplement to the basic revenue code be-
cause it imposed an income tax on partnerships as entities:
Sec. 201. That in addition to the taxes under existing law and under this act there
shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the income of
every corporation, partnership, or individual, a tax... equal to the following percen-
tages of the net income ....
War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 201, 40 Stat. 300, 303 (1919).
The tax was based on the ratio of "net income" to "invested capital for the taxable year,"
and was supplemental to taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1916, which provided that
"[p]ersons carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individ-
ual capacity." Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756, 762 (1917).
145. I.R.C. § 706 (West Supp. 1988).
146. Id. § 703(b).
147. Id. § 167.
148. I.R.C. § 446(c) (1982); I.R.C. § 703(b) (West Supp. 1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.703-1(b)
(1974).
149. I.R.C. § 453 (West Supp. 1988).
150. Id. §§ 6221-6231.
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ments that could violate basic policies of federal income taxation. For
example, certain transactions between a partner and the partnership
will be treated as transactions between the partnership and an outsider
in order to assure that compensation for services will be reported as
ordinary income. I51
Other provisions give partners the choice of an aggregate or an en-
tity model. For example, the general rule is that, when a partner pur-
chases his partnership interest, he will not be given a special basis in
each of the partnership's assets to reflect the price he paid for his
partnership interest.12 On the other hand, if the partnership files an
election, those who purchase partnership interests may ignore the en-
tity approach and claim they purchased a direct interest in the under-
lying assets of the partnership. As a result, each partner will be given
a special basis in the underlying partnership assets to reflect the price
she paid for her partnership interest.' Another example of the choice
given partners to opt out of an entity approach and into an aggregate
approach is the provision that gives certain partners the opportunity
to "elect out" of the partnership provisions of Subchapter K.'54
New Uniform Partnership Act provisions should be considered in
light of their impact on federal income tax classification. As under
state law, intent to be classified as partners is evidence of partnership,
but the ultimate "intent" question is not the parties' thoughts con-
cerning how they are classified; the ultimate question is whether they
intended to enter a relationship, however denominated, the essence of
which is tax partnership.'55 People can be partners for tax purposes
even though their relationship is not one of partnership under state
law. Tax classification is determined under the Code and is ultimately
independent of state law classification. 5 6
151. Id. § 707(a)(2).
152. I.R.C. § 743(a) (1982).
153. I.R.C. § 743(b) (1982 & West Supp. 1988).
154. I.R.C. § 761(a) (West Supp. 1988).
155. On the matter of intent, the Supreme Court has said that all facts must be considered:
The question is ... whether, considering all the facts-the agreement, the conduct of
the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinter-
ested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital con-
tributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used, and any
other facts throwing light on their true intent-the parties in good faith and acting
with a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enter-
prise.
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). For a much more recent case in which
the parties were held to be tax partners even though neither they nor their government regulators
considered them partners, see Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.
1980), afr'g 72 T.C. 521 (1979).
156. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (as amended in 1983).
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The Code defines the term "partnership" to include any "syndi-
cate, group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this
title, a corporation or a trust or estate." '15 7 Thus, the Code defines
partnership in the negative, and that is why the category of tax part-
nership is potentially enormous. Partnership is a residual category. If
any unincorporated business group is nothing else for tax purposes (a
corporation or trust or estate), it is a partnership. And "partner" is
defined to include any member of the group.' s8 The "term 'partner-
ship' is broader in scope than the common law meaning of partner-
ship, and may include groups not commonly called partnerships."'5 9
On the other hand, an organization will not necessarily be deemed a
partnership for tax purposes simply because it is classified as some
kind of partnership under state law.
Great controversy has surrounded the tax classification of limited
partnerships, particularly publicly syndicated and traded partnerships.
The present classification regulations, as interpreted by a major tax
court decision in which the Service indicated its acquiescence, 160 have
made it extremely difficult for any ULPA limited partnership, includ-
ing one that has a sole corporate general partner, to be treated as any-
thing other than a partnership for tax purposes. 61
The regulations begin in what seems like a reasonable way by list-
ing:
a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure
corporation which, taken together, distinguish it from other
organizations. These are: (i) associates, (ii) an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv)
centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts
157. I.R.C. § 761(a) (West Supp. 1988) (applicable for income tax purposes only). See also
id. § 7701(a)(2) (a virtually identical definition that applies to all of Title 26, which includes
subtitles relating to income tax, estate and gift tax, employment tax, and procedure and adminis-
tration).
158. Id. §§ 761(b), 7701(a)(2).
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1972).
160. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-2 C.B. 2.
161. Regulations under the Revenue Act of 1916 first took the position that all limited part-
nerships were taxable as corporations. However, these regulations were soon replaced by regula-
tions that applied a "resemblance" test. For a history of the classification question, see Sexton &
Osteen, Classification as a Partnership or an Association Taxable as a Corporation, 24 TUL. TAX
INST. 95 (1975). Cf. Heritage Hills v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 601 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that a limited partnership composed entirely of corporations was not a corporation for
purposes of Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act).
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limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of
interests. 162
The regulations also state, without explanation, that in addition to
these "major" factors, "other factors may be found .. .which may
be significant in classifying an organization as an association, a part-
nership, or a trust."1 63 The regulations proceed, however, to make it
virtually impossible for any Uniform Act partnership or ULPA lim-
ited partnership to be classified as anything other than a partnership
for tax purposes.'6 They do this in two ways. First, they state that the
first two characteristics are common to both partnerships and corpo-
rations and that three of the four remaining characteristics must be
found before an organization will be classified as a corporation.
65
This "numerical supremacy test" provides that, if only two of these
remaining four characteristics are present, partnership classification
results. 66 Second, the regulations define these characteristics in bi-
zarre ways. The regulations are biased toward partnership classifica-
tion because they are the remnants from the days when the Service
was attempting to tax professional associations as partnerships. They
remain controversial because they classify as partnerships for tax pur-
poses organizations that look very much like corporations. It was not
until December of 1987 that Congress took a different tack by declar-
ing that certain publicly traded limited partnerships are to be taxed as
corporations.
67
Some of the suggested changes to the Uniform Act appear to bear
at least indirectly on the tax classification of partnerships. Continuity
of life and free transferability of interests appear to be enhanced by
provisions such as those requiring registration of partnerships and
those redefining dissolution and its consequences. Centralized man-
agement might be strengthened by provisions authorizing voting and
limiting the agency of certain partners. None of the changes more
broadly discussed, however, would restrict the unlimited personal lia-
bility of partners. That personal liability has great significance for
federal income tax purposes. Indeed, given that the unlimited personal
liability of profit sharers is a policy upon which states seem to place
162. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983).
163. Id.
164. See Weidner, The Existence of State and Tax Partnerships: A Primer, 11 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 1, 64-88 (1983).
165. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2)-(3) (as amended in 1983).
166. Id.
167. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330-382, 1330-403 to
-405 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 7704).
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little or no value, as indicated by their recent liberalization of limited
partnership statutes, one wonders whether the tacit concession of the
personal liability of partners is in recognition of the fact that the fed-
eral tax tail really wags the state organization dog.
VII. CONCLUSION
Two principal developments should be considered in a reevaluation
of the law of partnership. First, the business and investment use of the
partnership has changed. The partnership continues to be used in ven-
tures involving family members and small groups of businesspersons,
but it is also used in associations of unprecedented size and complex-
ity. The drafters of the original act might have marveled at both the
extraordinarily detailed prospectuses attendant publicly syndicated
partnerships, 16 and at the fact that single offerings have involved as
much as hundreds of millions of dollars. Although by far the greatest
number of syndicated partnership offerings are of limited partner-
ships, general partnerships have also been syndicated, and "privately"
held partnerships have increased in size and complexity. Legal and ac-
counting firms with hundreds of partners in offices that necklace the
globe command at least part of our attention. Even in small towns, it
is common to have partnerships that consist of corporate partners or
that have other partnerships or limited partnerships as members. Sec-
ond, the legal climate has also changed. As a regulatory matter, part-
nership law now covers many situations that are also regulated by
federal or state securities laws. More basically, however, the law of
other business organizations has changed.
168. The Empire State Building, for example, was the object of a publicly syndicated offer-
ing of units of participation in general partnership interests. The prospectus in that syndication
described the investors as "joint venturers" and reflected an opinion of counsel that they would
qualify as partners for federal income tax purposes. EMPIRE STATE BUILDING ASSOCIATES PRO-
SPECTUS (Oct. 31, 1961), reprinted in 1 S. ROULAC, SYNDICATION LANDMARKS 105, 117 (1974). It
does seem clear that the absence of control of a joint venturer or partner can at least raise a
serious question whether she has purchased a security:
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated a security if the in-
vestor can establish, for example, that (1) an agreement among the parties leaves so
little power in the hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact dis-
tributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so
inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelli-
gently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so
dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter that
he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful part-
nership or venture powers.
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (footnote
omitted). But see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
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There are five basic changes in the law of business associations that
should be considered in the revision of the Uniform Partnership Act.
First, and perhaps of least importance, general incorporation acts
have been liberalized and made more flexible. If nothing else, this lib-
eralization indicates the diminishing state policy in favor of personal
liability of entrepreneurs. Second, the RULPA has radically liberal-
ized the extent to which limited partners may take part in the control
of the business and still retain their limited liability. These changes not
only reflect a strong move to the entity theory in the partnership con-
text but also a virtual extinguishment of state policy favoring personal
liability for unincorporated profit-sharers. Third, special statutory
provisions have been drafted to deal with the subject of the closely-
held corporation. These provisions outline the different types of relief
courts can award to dissatisfied shareholders. Compared to the cur-
rent statutory provisions for dissatisfied partners or assignees of part-
nership interests, these close corporation provisions are much more
clear and offer a broader, more even continuum of remedies. Fourth,
there has been considerable discussion in the corporate context con-
cerning duties of care and of loyalty- when they arise, when they can
be drafted away, and when they can be indemnified against. Particu-
larly if partnerships are to be substituted for corporations because of
the new federal income tax regime, the Commissioners ought at least
keep these developments in mind. Fifth, and perhaps of greatest im-
portance, the Uniform Act was adopted prior to the imposition of the
federal income tax.
The federal income tax law suggests that a pragmatic rather than a
doctrinaire approach be taken to the entity/aggregate dichotomy. It
also suggests a major reason why partnerships, general or limited,
continue at all. The federal tax law presently taxes corporations and
partnerships very differently. It refuses to adopt a "check the box"
approach that permits business organizations to elect to be taxed con-
sistently according to one model or the other. On the other hand, the
tax law permits the effect of an election out of the corporate income
tax by the more indirect and cumbersome route of forming an organi-
zation that is classified as a partnership under state law. Although tax
classification is a matter of federal law and not state law, federal law
as a practical matter relies very heavily on state law. One result is that
limited partnerships that have no general partners other than corpora-
tions are routinely classified not as corporations but as partnerships
for federal income tax purposes. After years of controversy surround-
ing this rule, the only significant inroad is that certain publicly-traded
limited partnerships will now be taxed as corporations. 69 As a practi-
169. I.RoC. § 7704 (West Supp. 1988).
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cal matter, the state law of partnership now provides a foundation for
businesses that seek to avoid the corporate income tax. Stated some-
what differently, state law has come to help the federal tax law avoid
the appearance of elevating form over substance. 0 °
The present law of general partnerships should continue to deal
with the inadvertent partnership and the informal partnership. As in
the time of Ames and Lewis, a central task of the statute is to serve as
the partnership agreement in the absence of one crafted by the partici-
pants. The whole area of dissolution remains as troubled as it was in
the time of Ames, if not more so, and requires a careful reconsidera-
tion. The Commissioners should consider whether to continue to pro-
vide very powerful liquidation remedies for the dissatisfied partner or
whether to confine certain partners to less drastic remedies analogous
to those provided in close corporation acts. If the power of a partner
to compel liquidation is limited, it may then become even more impor-
tant to have more fully developed notions of the duties of care and
loyalty that will provide the basis for lesser remedies. Those duties
appear to merit more direct statement than exists under the present
act. The Commissioners may wish to consider the extent to which
these duties may be drafted away and indemnified against. Recent
thinking in the corporate area should inform the discussion.
This article does not mean to suggest that the law of business organ-
izations be rewritten within the confines of a partnership project. On
the other hand, it does seem appropriate to observe that, if the law
could be written today on a tabula rasa, there would not be separate
statutes for the partnership, the limited partnership, the corporation
and the close corporation. More narrowly, consideration of the gen-
eral partnership statute might have preceded the revision of the lim-
ited partnership statute. On the other hand, given that the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act has only recently been completed,
receiving at least the initial blessings of the Internal Revenue Service
170. The American Law Institute Federal Income Tax Project recently recommended contin-
ued reliance on state law classification except in the case of publicly-traded partnerships:
PROPOSAL 0 - PARTNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION
1. GENERAL RULE
A partnership organized and operated under the Uniform Partnership Act or the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, as either act is substantially in effect in any State,
and not publicly traded within the meaning of Paragraph 2 below, shall be treated as a
partnership for Federal income tax purposes.
2. DEFINITION OF PUBLICLY-TRADED PARTNERSHIPS
An interest in a limited partnership shall be considered publicly-traded only if at
any time in the partnership's existence, interests in the partnership are traded in an
established securities market.
FEDERAL IcOmE TAX PROJECT 109 (Am. Law Inst. Tent. Draft No. 7, 1981).
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for tax classification purposes, 17 1 the partnership project can proceed
to move the general partnership more toward the corporate or entity
model without fear of adverse tax consequences.
171. See 4 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 184-86 n.21
(1987).
